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Articles 
Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: 
Crawford v. Washington, a Reassessment of the 
Confrontation Clause 
Honorable Paul W. Grimml & Professor Jerome E. Deise, Jr.2 
During the 2004 legislative session, the Governor of Maryland 
introduced two bills designed to address the issue of witness 
intimidation in criminal cases. The bills, Senate Bill 185 and House 
Bill 296, contained numerous measures aimed at combating the 
problem of witness intimidation. Among the provisions was a 
proposal to add to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland a "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception 
to the hearsay rule, patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 
which has been in existence for more than twenty years. Neither bill 
was enacted into law. Legislators interviewed by the press during the 
legislative session expressed concern about the proposed hearsay 
exception, specifically citing the Supreme Court's March 8, 2004 
decision in Crawford v. Washington 3 as evidence that the Governor's 
proposal was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment 
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3 Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
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Confrontation Clause.4 In fact, Crawford does not directly address the 
constitutionality of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception; 
in dicta, the Court clearly expressed its approval of this Rule. 
This article first examines the Crawford decision, then the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, and 
demonstrates that the proposed exception is not constitutionally 
infirm. 
Michael Crawford allegedly stabbed Kenneth Lee after 
learning that Lee tried to rape Crawford's wife. In a recorded 
statement to police, Crawford's wife, Sylvia, said that Lee did not 
draw a weapon before Crawford stabbed him. The State intended to 
use Sylvia's statement to controvert Crawford's claim of self-defense. 
At trial, Sylvia invoked the marital privilege, and was, therefore, 
"unavailable" to testify for the State against her husband. Under 
Washington law, the marital privilege does not extend to a spouse's 
out-of-court statement that is otherwise admissible under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.s The State, therefore, sought to 
introduce Sylvia's statement as admissible hearsay. 
The State argued that, by invoking the state marital privilege, 
which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other 
spouse's consent, Sylvia was an "unavailable" witness, under the 
Washington evidence rule equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(a)(1). Further, noting that Sylvia admitted leading Crawford to 
Lee's apartment, thereby facilitating the assault, the State contended 
that her statement qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule as a 
statement against penal interest, under the Washington evidence rule 
equivalent of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b )(3). The prosecutor played the tape 
of Sylvia's statement to the jury during Crawford's trial for assault 
and attempted murder, and, in closing, argued that the tape was 
"damning evidence that completely refute[d] [Crawford's] claim of 
self-defense."6 Sylvia'S tape-recorded statement was offered against 
4 Kimberly A.c. Wilson, Ehrlich Urges Panel to Give 2nd Chance to Criminal 
Justice Bill Legislators Killed, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 10, 2004 at Local 5B. 
The story reports Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., chairman of the house committee 
that considered HB 296, as saying, "Clearly, if that bill had gone to the floor that 
way [containing the proposed hearsay exception], it would have been deemed 
unconstitutional [under CrawfordJ." 
5 WASH. REv. CODE §5.60.060 (West, WESTLA W through 2004 legislation). 
6 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358. 
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Crawford without affording him the opportunity to confront or cross-
examine her, and the jury subsequently convicted Crawford of first 
degree assault. 
The crucial issue presented was whether this procedure 
complied with the Sixth Amendment guarantee that, "in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him."7 Crawford presented the Court with 
an old dilemma. On the one hand, the Government has a legitimate 
interest in prosecuting criminal defendants, and therefore, should be 
allowed to offer relevant and otherwise admissible evidence to prove 
a defendant's guilt. On the other hand, the Constitution provides 
rights to the accused in criminal proceedings and bars the 
admissibility of certain evidence violative of those rights, even though 
the evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. 
Crawford also raises a host of intriguing questions. These are 
but a few: What does the phrase, "witnesses against him," as 
provided in the Sixth Amendment, actually mean? When is a 
statement a "testimonial" statement and when is it "non-testimonial?" 
Which statements implicate the Confrontation Clause? Are certain 
hearsay statements beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause? 
Do the Constitutional rights of an accused "trump" (if that is an 
appropriate metaphor) the rules of evidence? Do the rules of 
evidence ever "trump" the Constitutional rights of an accused, or 
does neither "trump" the other? Under what circumstances must the 
defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine a now 
"unavailable" hearsay declarant before those statements can be 
admitted? Can a criminal defendant, by his conduct, "waive" or 
"forfeit" an objection to the admissibility of certain hearsay 
statements? Can he "waive" or "forfeit" his right to Confrontation? 
No doubt, in the fullness of time, scholars and judges will 
answer many of these questions, or die trying. There are already 
available excellent analyses of Crawford by various legal scholars;8 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
8 See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Fitzpatrick, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 
Little Brown & Co. (database updated July 2004, Chapter 8 Hearsay, §398.l 
Testimonial and Nontestimonial Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause); George 
Fisher, EVIDENCE, Foundation Press, 2002 (2004 Replacement to text pages 521-50); 
Jon R. Waltz & Roger Park, EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS, 10th ed. (June 2004 
Update Memo); Daniel J. Capra, Dennis D. Prater, Stephen A. Salzburg & Christine 
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therefore, any further attempt by us to do so is unnecessary. Rather, 
for our comprehension and appreciation of the broader and finer 
points of Crawford, we go to the "horse's mouth," so to speak. For our 
understanding of Crawford, we rely principally upon the comments, 
thoughts, and observations of Jeffrey L. Fisher, lead counsel for 
Michael D. Crawford in the United States Supreme Court.9 
The article begins, in Part I, with an historical review of the 
Confrontation Clause. In Part II, we discuss Crawford's impact on the 
Confrontation Clause. Finally, in Part III, we argue that, in light of 
Crawford, Maryland should adopt Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), which 
provides that statements made by witnesses that are unavailable to 
testify at trial because of threat, intimidation, chicanery, or 
elimination by the defendant or his agents are admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule.lO 
Although the facts in Crawford did not involve forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, the Court, in passing, made clear that when a criminal 
defendant wrongfully prevents witnesses from testifying, his conduct 
"extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds."ll We discuss "forfeiture by wrongdoing" more fully in 
M. Arguello, EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD, 2d ed. LexisNexis, (2004 Letter 
Update; Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna Raeder & David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 2d ed., Mathew Bender (note by Prof. Rothstein, 2004 
Letter Update). 
9 The authors wish to thank Jeffrey L. Fisher, Attorney at Davis Wright Tremaine 
LLP, Seattle, WA, for his kindness and generosity in allowing us to draw upon the 
outline notes of his lecture, entitled Crawford v. Washington: Reframing The Right 
To Confrontation. This outline incorporates post-Crawford decisions through 
August 3, 2004. We owe an additional debt of gratitude to Professor Lynn McLain 
of the University of Baltimore School of Law for her thoughtful suggestions. 
10 Fed. R. Evid. 802. 
II Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-
59 (1879»; see also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir. 2001) 
("threats, actual violence, or murder" forfeit confrontation rights); People v. Moore, 
2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1354, (declarant's death at the hands of the defendant was a 
"forfeiture of the constitutional right of confrontation with respect to a witness or 
potential witness whose absence the defendant wrongfully procures). Id. at 10; see 
post-Crawford cases: State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 (2004) (Defendant'S right of 
confrontation forfeited because he killed the declarant). Id. at 793-94. (The Court 
cited Crawford as support for the extinction of a confrontation claim. Statement by 
witness was admitted under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-460(d)(3). That statutory 
exception requires (1) that the declarant be unavailable, (2) that the statement was 
made at a time when the declarant recently perceived the matter, while declarant's 
recollection was clear, and (3) that the statement was made in good faith prior to the 
8 
sections II and III. As will be seen, not all hearsay statements are 
excluded by the Confrontation Clause where a defendant does not 
have a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
I. Crawford v. Washington: An Historical Overview 
Crawford provides an interesting glimpse of the Court's 
approach to Constitutional interpretation. It begins by looking to the 
language of the Constitution - in this case, the Sixth Amendment. 
When the Constitution's text alone is inadequate to resolve a 
particular issue, the Court turns to the history of the Confrontation 
Clause.12 While the right to confront one's accusers can be traced to 
Roman times, the founding generation's immediate source was 
common law.13 English common law differs from the civil law 
tradition in the manner in which witnesses provide testimony in 
criminal trials. The former is a tradition of live testimony, while the 
latter condones examination in private by judicial officers.14 
England adopted some elements of civil law practice, 
including the practice of admitting ex parte statements of accusers 
against the accused at trial. This practice II occasioned frequent 
demands by the prisoner to have his I accusers' brought before him 
face to face. illS During the 16th Century reign of Queen Mary, justices 
commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or distort). Jd. at 613. 
(The Court decided on the grounds of "forfeiture by wrongdoing," and declined to 
assess whether the statement was testimonial or not). Jd. at 614; State v. Fields, 679 
N.W. 2d 341 (Minn. 2004) (In its analysis of Crawford as applied in the case at bar, 
the Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation was not violated, as he 
forfeited that right by his wrongdoing). Jd. at 346-47. (The Court also noted that 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) "probably amounts as well to a forfeiture of an objection 
based on the right of confrontation" and that the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do not 
include such a rule). Jd. at 347 n.2. 
12 The Court's opinion provides a detailed and informative discussion of the 
historical development of the right to confrontation; it is, therefore, unnecessary, for 
the purposes of this article, to repeat it here. We have included only those historical 
facts needed to aid in our discussion. 
13 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Coy v. Jona, 457 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988); 
Herman & Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the 
Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. 1. INT'LL. 481 (1994)). 
14 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See 3 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1768)). 
15 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (citing 1 James F. Stephen, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (London, MacMillan 1883)). 
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of the peace were appointed, under the Marian bail and committal 
statutes, to examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases and certify 
the results to the court. While it is unlikely the original purpose of 
these examinations was to produce evidence admissible at trial, 16 they 
were used this way in subsequent cases, thereby adopting the 
continental, civil law procedureY 
Perhaps the most notorious example of this practice was the 
1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Raleigh was charged with treason. 
Damning evidence against him consisted of a letter and a statement, 
obtained by the Privy Council, of Raleigh's alleged accomplice, Lord 
Cobham, which was read to the jury over Raleigh's objections. 
Raleigh believed Cobham made the statement to save his own life and 
that he would recant if he was required to face Raleigh at trial. 
Raleigh, protesting that he was being tried "by the Spanish 
Inquisition,"IS demanded that the judges call Cobham to appear. 
Raleigh argued, unsuccessfully, that "the Proof of the Common Law 
is by witness and jury: Let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my 
accuser before my face."19 Cobham did not appear at trial, however, 
and Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death. 
Following considerable dissatisfaction with the process used 
to convict Raleigh, English law, through a series of statutory and 
judicial reforms, developed a right of confrontation to limit such 
abuses in certain cases, such as treason. Courts developed relatively 
strict rules of unavailability, admitting ex parte examinations only 
when the witness was demonstrably unable to testify in person.20 
Throughout this period, a "recurring question was whether 
the admissibility of an unavailable witness's pretrial examination 
depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-
examine him."21 This question was answered in the affirmative in 
1696 by the Court of the King's Bench, which ruled that the statement 
16 Id. (See John H. Langrein, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 21-34 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1974)). 
17 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (See M. Hale, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 284 (1736); 
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 528-30 (3d ed. 1944)). 
18 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Raleigh's Case, 2 How. ST. TR. 15-16 (H.L. 
1603)). 
19 Id. 
20 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. ST. TR. 769-71 
(H.L. 1666)). 
21 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360. 
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of a deceased witness was inadmissible "where 'the defendant not 
being present when [it was] taken before the mayor ... had lost the 
benefit of cross-examination.fJJ22 
Following the Crawford Court's discussion of the development 
of the right to confrontation in England, the Court turned its attention 
to the colonies, where similar practices were employed.23 "Early in 
the 18th Century, the Virginia Council protested against the Governor 
for having 'privately issued several commissions to examine 
witnesses against particular men ex parte,' complaining that 'the 
person accused is not admitted to be confronted with, or defend 
against his defamers."'24 The Court also noted that, prior to the 
American Revolution, England allocated jurisdiction over Stamp Act 
offenses to the admiralty courts, which followed civil law, and thus 
regularly took testimony by deposition or private judicial 
examination.25 
"Many declarations of rights adopted around the time of the 
Revolution guaranteed a right of confrontation."26 While the proposed 
Federal Constitution did not, the First Congress, responding to 
objections to its exclusion, included the Confrontation Clause in what 
became the Sixth Amendment,27 While all states adopted the 
Confrontation Clause, some went so far as to hold out-of-court 
statements inadmissible even where the accused had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant,28 Many states rejected 
this view, but only after reaffirming that admissibility depended on 
the prior opportunity of the accused to cross-examine.29 
22 Id. at 1360-61 (quoting King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165,87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 
(1896». 
23 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1362. 
24 Id. (quoting A MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE MAL-ADMINISTRATION OF HIS 
EXCELLENCY FRANCIS NICHOLSON, reprinted in 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 
253,257 (D. Douglas ed. 1955». 
25 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1362. 
26 Id. See MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RiGHTS, Article 21 (1867), providing, 
inter alia, right to confrontation and examination of witnesses under oath to citizens 
of Maryland. 
27 Id. at 1362-63. 
28 Id. at 1363. 
29 Id. 
11 
II. Crawford and the Right to Confrontation 
Crawford argued that, state law notwithstanding, the 
admission of Sylvia's tape-recorded statement violated his federal 
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.3D 
Applying the then-current standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts,31 the 
Washington trial court held that the Confrontation Clause does not 
bar the statement of an unavailable witness (such as Sylvia) against a 
criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate indicia of 
reliability."32 To meet that standard, evidence must either fall within a 
"firmly rooted hearsay exception," or "bear particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness."33 The trial court admitted the statement on the latter 
ground, offering as proof of the statement's trustworthiness that 
Sylvia was not shifting blame to Crawford, but rather corroborating 
his story that he acted in self-defense or "justified reprisal."34 The trial 
court found persuasive that Sylvia had direct knowledge as an 
eyewitness, that she was describing recent events, and that a 
"neutral" law enforcement officer questioned her.35 
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, applying a nine-
factor test to determine if Sylvia's statement bore particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. In concluding that it did not, the court 
offered several reasons: The statement contradicted one she had 
previously given; it was made in response to specific questions; and, 
at one point, Sylvia admitted that she closed her eyes during the 
stabbing.36 The court considered and rejected the State's argument 
that Sylvia's statement was reliable because it coincided with 
Crawford's to such a degree that the two "interlocked."37 Although 
the two statements were consistent in their accounts of events leading 
up to the stabbing, they differed on the crucial issue of self-defense. 
30 Id. 
31 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
32 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (1980)) (Emphasis 
added). 
33 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (Emphasis added). 
34 Id. 
35Id. at 1358. 
36Id. 
37Id. at 1355. 
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"[Crawford's] version assert[ed] that Lee may have had something in 
his hand when Crawford stabbed him; but Sylvia's version [had] Lee 
grabbing for something only after he [had] been stabbed."38 
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, 
unanimously concluding that, although Sylvia's statement did not fall 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of 
trustworthiness. The court found that "when a co-defendant's 
confession is virtually identical [ i.e., interlocks] to that of a defendant, 
it may be deemed reliable."39 
This procedural history reflects both the Supreme Court's 
struggle to resolve the controversy and the inadequacies of the Roberts 
two-pronged standard. The failings of Roberts were indeed "on full 
display in the proceedings below."40 As Professor George Fisher 
points out: 
38 Id. at 1358. 
[T]he Court's many attempts to 
reconcile the hearsay exception with the 
Confrontation Clause's command have 
been halting and nonlinear . . . . In the 
pre-Roberts era, beginning with Mattox v. 
United States, the Court issued a number 
of ad hoc judgments to resolve particular 
controversies, but made little attempt to 
systematize the Confrontation Clause's 
impact on the admission of hearsay. The 
Court first undertook this task in earnest 
in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
39 Crawford v. State of Washington, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (2002) (The Court, quoting 
State of Washington v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 (1993), explained: "Although the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the statements were contradictory, upon closer 
inspection they appear to overlap .... [B]oth of the Crawfords' statements indicate 
that Lee was possibly grabbing for a weapon, but they are equally unsure when this 
event may have taken place. They are also equally unsure how Michael received the 
cut on his hand, leading the Court to question when, if ever, Lee possessed a weapon. 
In this respect they overlap . . .. [N]either Michael nor Sylvia clearly stated that 
Lee had a weapon in hand from which Michael was simply defending himself. And 
it is this omission by both that interlocks the statements and makes Sylvia's 
statement reliable." Id. at 664. (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 Crawford, 124 S. Ct at 1372. 
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There the Court launched an ultimately 
aborted attempt to crystallize 
Confrontation doctrine around the 
familiar hearsay principles of necessity 
and reliability. Early in 2004, after 
tinkering with the Roberts framework for 
nearly a quarter-century, the Court 
finally abandoned the task. In Crawford 
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), it 
set Confrontation on an entirely new 
footing, focused on the "testimonial" 
nature of the out-of-court statement. 
After Crawford, it seems, Roberts and its 
reliability-based analysis are dead.41 
The Supreme Court drew two inferences from its exhaustive 
historical analysis about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. "First, 
the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was 
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused."42 The English 
Crown employed "these practices in notorious treason cases like 
Raleigh's; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law's assertion 
of a right of confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the 
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be 
interpreted with this focus in mind."43 
Second, the Court determined that "the Framers would not 
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who 
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."44 As 
will be seen, neither of these two evils are implicated by the 
41 George Fisher, EVIDENCE, Supplement, at p.l, Foundation Press, 2004 (discussing 
the Pre-Roberts Era Cases: Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); and the Roberts 
Era Cases: Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (rules of "necessity" and 
"reliability"); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346 (1992); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999». 
42 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363. 
43 Id. 
44 /d. at 1365. 
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Constitution or the hearsay exception provided by Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6). So then, when does the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation apply? 
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only in a 
criminal case and only when the prosecutor offers a hearsay statement 
against the accused. If the declarant testifies in court and is, therefore, 
subject to cross-examination, the right is not violated. If the accused 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant previously, the 
right is not violated. If the statement offered is the declarant's, it is 
not hearsay if it is offered as a prior statement, under Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1), or as an admission of a party-opponent, under Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2); therefore, the right is not violated. 
Under Maryland Rule 5-802(1), certain prior statements by 
witnesses are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Nor are statements, 
otherwise admissible, made by the accused when offered by the State, 
under Md. Rule 5-803(a) as a statement by a party-opponent. 
Furthermore, under Md. Rule 5-803(a), statements of a party-
opponent are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
defendant is available as a witness. If a statement is not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and the right is 
not violated. If the statement is offered for its truth, the prosecutor 
must offer an appropriate exception; if she cannot, the hearsay 
statement is excluded and the right is not violated. It is only when a 
statement is offered for its truth and falls within an exception that we 
consider the statement's effect on the Confrontation Clause. If the 
statement is "testimonial," then we tum to Crawford to determine 
whether it violates the Confrontation Clause, even though it may be 
admissible under the rules of evidence. If the statement is not 
testimonial, then it appears that, despite Justice Scalia's severe 
criticism of Roberts's reliance upon such an "amorphous" concept as 
reliability, its unpredictability, and its "unpardonable vice" (i.e., its 
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation 
Clause clearly meant to exclude),45 states may continue to rely upon 
the Roberts standard. 
45 Id. at 1371. 
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When Is a Statement a "Testimonial?" 
While it is clear that Crawford applies to "testimonial" 
statements, it is not entirely clear what that term means. In a 
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice 
O'Connor, severely criticized the majority opinion for both its 
linguistic ambiguity and its difficult implementation for judges and 
lawyers alike.46 The Court opted to "leave for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial;'" nevertheless, 
there is language in the opinion from which we may attempt to glean 
its meaning.47 According to the Court, "testimonial" statements 
include: 
Ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent - that is, material 
such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony . . . or 
similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to 
be used prosecutorially. . . [, and] 
[e ]xtrajudicial statements ... contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.48 
The Court described these as "core" testimonial statements, 
but suggested that this list was not exhaustive.49 As Jeffrey 1. Fisher, 
lead counsel for Michael Crawford in his case before the Supreme 
Court, points out, "the confrontation right does not apply only to 
abuses at the time of the Founding; it also applies to modern types of 
statements that the Framers would have barred."so 
46 Id. at 1374-78. 
47 Id.atI374. 
48 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (Internal citations omitted). 
49 Fisher notes (p. 3) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364). 
50 Fisher notes (p. 3) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.3). (In addition, Fisher 
suggests several "clues" within the Court's jurisprudence that might provide 
meaning to the term. For example: "An accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
16 
Whatever else the term covers, it applies 
at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial [] and to police 
interrogations, 51 ••• [] allocutions, guilty 
pleas, and other formal statements 
admitting guilt52• • • • [In addition,] 
"letters" to police or other governmental 
officials accusing someone of 
wrongdoing are testimonial.53 • • 
Coroner reports, drug chemist reports, 
etc. [] should be testimonial because 
they are statements made for the 
purpose of producing evidence for 
litigation. 54 ••• [S]tatements of elderly or 
dependent adult victims to law 
remark to an acquaintance does not. . . . Involvement of government officers in the 
production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents a unique potential for 
prosecutorial abuse .... Sylvia's recorded statement, knowingly given in response to 
structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition . . . . 
[Wi hen the government is involved in the statements' production and when the 
statements describe past events . .. [the statements] implicate the core concerns of 
the old ex parte affidavit practice .... [A]n out-ofcourt accusation is universally 
conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused." While this 
definition would seem to include excited utterances, opinions differ about whether 
such statements are, or should be, included. Fisher's "clues", however, are more 
problematic and several are likely to be the subject of considerable debate.}. 
51 Fisher notes (p. 3) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374) ("We use the term 
'interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense. . . . 
'[S]tructured police questioning' qualifies as an interrogation 'under any conceivable 
definition."') (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4). 
52 Fisher notes (p. 3) ("These are testimonial. See 124 S. Ct. at 1372, abrogating 
United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 2003), and similar 
holdings in other circuits allowing admission of allocutions. See also Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 53 (1 899)(guilty pleas); United States v. Massino, 319 F. 
Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (guilty pleas)"}. 
53 Fisher notes (p. 4) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct at 1360) (noting that an accusatory 
"letter" was used against Sir Walter Raleigh). 
54 Fisher notes (p. 4) (See City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591 (Nev. 2004) 
(nurse's chain-of-custody affidavit concerning method of conducting and preserving 
blood alcohol test is testimonial); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 393 (2004) 
(report of blood test is testimonial). Immigration reports may be testimonial for the 
same reasons. (Fisher notes pA). 
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enforcement officials 
definition testimonial,55. 
are by 
[as are] 
[d]omestic violence accusations,56 .... 
Fisher, taking a decidedly pro-defense spin, argues that the 
following statements are "testimonial"; however, others would 
disagree, urging that their status as "testimonial statements" is by no 
means clear nor have they been universally accepted as such by the 
courts: 
[c ]hild hearsay statementsp ... [w ]itness 
statements to officers investigating a 
55 Fisher notes (p. 4) (citing People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004)} (holding that a California law was invalid on its face). 
56 Fisher notes (p. 4) (stating, "These are testimonial almost by definition, for they 
condition admissibility on the statement accusing someone of criminal behavior; 
being made within 24 hours of alleged event; and being . . . 'recorded, either 
electronically or in writing' or 'made to a peace officer ... corrections officer, youth 
corrections officer, parole [or] probation officer, emergency medical technician or 
firefighter.') (See also People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. App. 2004) (wife's 
statements in a protection order testimonial.)"}. 
57 Fisher notes (p. 4-5) (stating, "When a child makes an accusation of abuse to a 
governmental agent in an interview, the statements are testimonial, in that they are 
given in a formalized setting as part of a criminal investigation, and a reasonable 
person would know that the statements would likely be used for evidentiary 
purposes. See Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. App. 2004) (holding that 
statements obtained under Maryland's child interview statute are testimonial); See 
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to 
child interview specialist at private victim assessment center was testimonial); State 
v. Courtney, 682 N.W. 2d 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (interview with child 
protective services worker testimonial); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to police investigator testimonial); People v. Vigil, 
2004 WL 1352647 (Colo. App. June 17, 2004) (child's statements to police officer 
and to a physician who was a member of a child protection team and a frequent 
prosecution witness in child abuse cases were testimonial, but prior statements to 
father and father's friend were not.). It is worth noting that the child's statements in 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), were given to a doctor in conjunction with the 
police's investigation; the Court suggested these statements were testimonial at oral 
argument in Crawford and arguably by its silence in the section of the opinion 
canvassing its prior holdings. See 124 S. Ct. at 1367-68 ('Our case law has largely 
been consistent with these two principles. '). If statements are given to a non-
governmental addressee before the police are involved and before litigation is 
contemplated, the question gets harder. See 124 S. Ct 1368 n.8 (stating that the 
child's statements to the police officer in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 326 (1992), were 
testimonial but not mentioning the child's statements to parent and others)"}. 
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crime/58 ••• 911 calls/59 .•• [s ]tatements to 
private investigators or to private 
58 Fisher notes (p. 5-6) (stating, "Since these statements generally are given for 
evidentiary purposes, they ordinarily are testimonial. See [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. [at] 
1368 n.8 (statement in White v Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), 'to an investigating 
police officer' was testimonial) ... (defining police 'interrogation'). It does not 
matter whether the statements are reproduced in police reports that ordinarily would 
satisfy 'business records' or any other hearsay exception .... The United States 
Solicitor General, in fact, has agreed that 'statements made to officers at the scene by 
a disinterested bystander who directly observed the commission of a crime and 
promptly reported it to the police' are testimonial. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Crawford at 26. Early court decisions, however, [are] divided on 
this issue. [Cf] United States v. Neilsen, 371 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 2004) (statement to 
an officer during execution of search warrant testimonial); Bell v. State, 597 S.E.2d 
350 (Ga. 2004) (alleged victim's statement to police officers 'during the officers' 
investigations of complaints made by the victim' testimonial); Heard v. 
Commonwealth, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. App. June 18, 2004) (unpublished) 
(agitated victim's statements to responding police officer were testimonial even 
though they qualified as excited utterances); and People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 
753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (alleged victim statement to investigating officer 
testimonial); State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213 (N.c. Ct. App. 2004) (statement made 
to officer 'during his initial investigation' at the scene of crime is testimonial) with 
Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, n. 22 (9th Cir. 2004) (alleged victim statement to 
officer responding to 911 call not testimonial); State v. Fowler, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]hen police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a 
request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately 
thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response 
thereto are not 'testimoniaL"'); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (same); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.c. Ct. App. 2004) (holding, over a 
dissent, that such a statement not testimonial because given right after event) and 
Cassidy v. Texas, 2004 WL 1114483 (Tex. App. May 20, 2004) (alleged victim's 
statement in police interview right after event not testimonial). For a very good 
discussion of this issue in an article prior to the Roberts era that advocated a rule 
similar to the testimonial approach, see Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation 
Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REv. 151, 194-95 
(1978) (distinguishing nontestimonial spontaneous declaration to robber in midst of 
robbery from a testimonial spontaneous declaration to a police officer immediately 
after robbery)"). 
59 Fisher notes (p. 6) (stating, "A call to report a crime (especially when followed 
by questions and answers with an operator) is testimonial, but a call solely for help 
may not be. See Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 PA. L. REv. 
1171, 1240-42 (2002). But even in the latter situation, statements made in a call in 
the heat of the moment that say more than 'come help me' should still be considered 
testimonial. Id.; People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2004) (holding that 911 call 
was testimonial) but see People v. Muscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2004) (suggesting that 
all 911calls that include requests for help are nontestimonial in their entirety). If 
statements in a 911 call explicitly accuse a particular person of wrongdoing, it may 
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victim's services organizations,60. . . 
[s ]tatements to doctors,61 ... [s ]tatements 
to undercover agents or informants62 [, 
and] [d]ying declarations.63 
also be worth citing the 'accusatory' language ... to bolster the argument. A case 
involving a 911 call is currently pending in the Washington Supreme Court and is set 
for oral argument .... See State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661 (2003), review granted, 75 
P.3d 969 (2003) (supplemental briefing ordered in light of Crawford)"). 
60 Fisher notes (p. 6) (stating, "If the setting was like an interview in that a 
reasonable witness would have expected his statements to be used for evidentiary 
purposes, then it seems testimonial even without governmental involvement. See 
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to 
child interview specialist at private victim assessment center was testimonial); 
Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. REv. 1011 
,1038-43 (1998); but see People v. Geno, 261 Mich. App. 624 (2004) (statement to 
director of Children's Assessment Center not testimonial because addressee was 
'not ... a government employee. ')"). 
61 Fisher notes (p.7) (stating, "If the police already are involved so that the 
examination is, in a sense, part of the investigation, then statements to the doctor are 
testimonial. Cf Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding, prior to Crawford, 
that the Confrontation Clause barred admission of victim's statement to doctor 
perfonning examination in coordination with police investigation). If, however, the 
police are not yet involved, this presents a closer question. But accusatory 
statements that are unnecessary for the medical treatment - such as identifying 'who 
did this'- are probably still testimonial, especially when laws impose reporting 
requirements on doctors. Early decisions on this score have not yet really dealt with 
the subtleties of this issue. See State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004) 
(holding that statement to doctor identifying perpetrator was not testimonial simply 
because 'there was [no] indication of government involvement in the initiation or 
course of the examination'); People v. Cage. 15 Cal Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App 
2004) (same)"). 
62 Fisher notes (p. 7) (stating, "A statement to such a person in the course of 
allegedly criminal activity is probably not testimonial. See [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. at 
1368 ('[a]nd Bourjaily v.United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), admitted 
statements made unwittingly to an FBI infonnant after applying a more general test 
that did not make prior cross-examination an indispensable requirement. '); United 
States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (statement to undercover infonnant not 
testimonial). But if the government really is trying to produce testimony rather than 
capture evidence of ongoing crime, the statements could be testimonial, especially if 
governmental involvement becomes a clearer touchstone in future cases for the 
testimonial inquiry. In other words, if one can argue that the government is really 
trying to circumvent the 'testimonial' rule in order to insulate a witness's narrative 
from a confrontation challenge, the declarant's statements may be testimonial even 
without the declarant's knowledge that his statement could be used for evidentiary 
purposes.)"). 
63 Fisher notes (p.7) (stating, "'If this exception must be accepted on historical 
grounds, it is sui generis.' [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. [at] 1367 n.6. Dying declarations 
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The Crawford Court held that "the constitutional admissibility 
of statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used for 
evidentiary purposes no longer turns in any way on 'the vagaries of 
the rules of evidence, much less [on] amorphous notions of 
'reliability."'64 Rather, "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, 
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation."65 Constitutional consideration requiring testimonial 
statements to be subject to cross-examination in criminal cases, 
"do[es] not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some 
broad, modem hearsay exception, even if that exception might be 
justifiable in other circumstances."66 
"Crawford continues to require that the defendant [have] an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him prior to 
trial." 67 "If the defendant was represented by counsel who had an 
that obviously are accusations for purpose of future prosecutions might also ... be 
viewed as admissible under the forfeiture doctrine, rather than as exception to realm 
of testimonial statements .... McDaniel v. State, 16 Miss. 401 (1847) ('It would be a 
perversion of [the Constitution's] meaning to exclude the proof, when the prisoner 
himself has been the guilty instrument of preventing the production of the witness by 
causing his death. '); State v Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004) (same)"). 
64 Fisher's notes (p. 2) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370); cf Roberts. 
65 Fisher's notes (p. 2) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374). 
66 Fisher's notes (p. 3) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n. 7) (citing United 
States. v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F.Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (irrelevant 
whether testimonial statement falls within hearsay exception for personal and family 
history); State v. Cox, 876 S.2d 932 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (same with regard to co-
conspirator statements). "The Court's further notation that 'to the extent that a 
hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all [in 1791], it required 
that the statements be made "immediate[ly]" upon the hurt received, and before [the 
declarant] had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage,' 124 S. Ct. 
at 1367 n. 7, was only by way of saying that to the extent that hearsay rules even 
existed as such at the time of the Founding, they respected the confrontation right's 
restrictions on testimonial statements. In other words, the scope of hearsay 
exceptions in criminal cases in 1791 gives us clues as to how broadly the Framers' 
conception of 'testimonial' evidence was." (Fisher notes (p. 3». 
67 Fisher notes (p. 8-9) (stating, "If the defendant was represented by counsel who 
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the same or similar 
motive for doing so, this satisfies the Confrontation Clause for statements given at 
that time. [Cf] Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972) (adequate cross 
because statement given at prior trial on same charges); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970) (adequate opportunity where statement was given at 
preliminary hearing where defendant was represented by counsel); United States v. 
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adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the same or 
similar motives for doing so, this satisfies the Confrontation Clause 
for statements given at the time."68 Similarly, I/[W]hen the declarant 
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
places no constraints at all on the use of prior statements[;] ... the 
Clause does not bar the admission of a statement so long as the 
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it."69 
Crawford does not change the law regarding the 
"unavailability" of a witness. The burden of proving that a witness is 
unavailable lies with the Government and requires a good faith effort 
to procure the witness, or, in the alternative, prove unavailability.7o 
Unavailability can be occasioned by a witness who is physically 
unavailable, such as when a witness has died, or when the 
Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir.2004) (same, although improperly resting 
decision on 'firmly rooted' language) with Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 
(1965) (inadequate opportunity when statement given in preliminary hearing where 
defendant was not represented by counsel); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54-
57 (1899) (inadequate opportunity when statement was given at prior trial where 
defendant was not a party and thus had no opportunity to cross-examine); and People 
v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (inadequate opportunity at all preliminary hearings 
because state law requires such hearings to be truncated)"). 
68 Fisher notes (p. 9). 
69 Fisher notes (p. 9) (stating, "This is so even if the witness cannot, or claims not to 
be able to, remember her prior testimonial statement. United States v. Owens, 484 
U.S. 554 (1988) (no confrontation violation even though head injury impaired 
witness's memory after he gave testimonial statement, so cross-examination was of 
limited utility); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (same with respect to 
witness [who] claimed memory loss at trial); See also People v. Martinez, 810 
N.E.2d 199 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (testimonial statement admissible because witness 
took the stand); Cooley v. State, 849 A.2d 1026 (Md. App. 2004) (same where 
witness recanted on the stand). If, however, the witness is forced to take the stand 
but refuses on privilege grounds to answer any questions at all, this does not suffice 
to make his prior testimonial statement admissible. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 415 (1965). Finally, if the defendant fails to ask for a witness he knows is 
available to take the stand, he may be found to have had an adequate opportunity for 
cross-examination. [Cf] In re Personal Restraint of Suave, 692 P.2d 818 (Wash. 
1985) (failing to call witness foreclosed confrontation claim) and State v. Salazar, 
796 P.2d 773 (Wash. 1990) (same) with State v. Cox, 876 So.2d 932 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (confrontation rights violated even though trial court offered defendant 
0jPortunity to subpoena witness)"). 
7 Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "See e.g. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 
(1969); People v. Miranda WL 1386237, at *7 (Cal. App. June 22, 2004) 
(unpublished opinion); Government negligence allowed witness to abscond. See 
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900)"). 
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Government is unable to locate a witness after making good faith 
efforts. Most frequently, a finding that a witness is unavailable is the 
result of a valid waiver, such as the Fifth Amendment or marital 
privilege. 71 "Perhaps when a witness (usually a young child) is 
incompetent to testify, she is unavailable as welL"n Failure by the 
Government to produce a witness may also violate the Confrontation 
Clause if the Government fails either to make a good faith effort to 
produce the witness, or to prove that the witness is legitimately 
unavailable.73 
Finally, we tum to the issue of "forfeiture by wrongdoing." 
The Crawford Court stated, "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
(which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially 
equitable grounds."74 Although the terms "waiver" and "forfeiture" 
are frequently used interchangeably, they are distinct concepts. 
"Forfeiture is a penalty against a party who engages in conduct of 
which a court disapproves."75 In this context, causing a witness to be 
71 Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) 
(plurality opinion) (Fifth Amendment) (Assuming Fifth Amendment invocation 
establishes unavailability); State v. Crawford, 147 Wn.2d 424 (2002) (marital 
privilege)"). 
72 Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "e.g. State v. c.J., 63 P.3d 765, 771 (2003) 
(incompetence establishes unavailability); [cf] Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 
(1990) ('assuming without deciding' that incompetence satisfies unavailability 
test)"). 
73 Supra fn. 65. 
74 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,150 
(1879) (a defendant who "voluntarily keeps the witness away ... cannot insist on his 
privilege" of confrontation) (Emphasis added). 
75 Valdez and Dahlberg, Tales from the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture by 
Misconduct and Its Applicability to the Texas Legal System, 31 St. MARY'S L.J. 99, 
n.32 (citing Alycia Sykora, Comment, Forfeiture by Misconduct: Proposed Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REv. 855, 860-61 (1996)) ("distinguishing 
forfeiture from waiver because forfeiture is punishment by wrongdoing, unlike 
waiver, which occurs through other forms of defendant conduct."); United States v. 
Potamitis, 739 F.2d (2d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d. at 
272-73) (stating that a defendant who causes the unavailability of a witness as an 
example of giving rise to a waiver of aright.) (explaining that "if [the] witness' 
silence is procured by the defendant himself, whether by chicanery, by threats, or by 
actual violence or murder, the defendant cannot then assert his confrontation clause 
rights in order to prevent [use of] prior grand jury testimony." Although this 
behavior has often been referred to as waiver, it is more accurately characterized as 
misconduct that results in forfeiture of confrontation rights. See Alycia Sykora, 
Comment: Forfeiture By Misconduct: Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 
804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REv. 855, 860-61 (1996). United States v. Bolano, 618 F.2d at 
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unavailable through misconduct operates as a forfeiture of both the 
right to confrontation and the right to object on hearsay grounds.76 
III. Confrontation and uForfeiture by Wrongdoing" 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), titled "forfeiture by wrongdoing," 
creates a hearsay exception permitting the introduction into evidence 
of "a statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced 
in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 
unavailability of the declarant as a witness."77 
The exception was added to the rules by the 1997 changes: 
[T]o provide that a party forfeits the 
right to object on hearsay grounds to the 
admission of a declarant's prior 
statement when the party's deliberate 
wrongdoing or acquiescence therein 
procured the unavailability of the 
629-30 (lOth Cir. 1979) (recounting how a witness who threatened a witness waived 
his right of confrontation, resulting in the introduction of the witness's grand jury 
testimony into evidence); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-53 (8th Cir. 
1976) (allowing grand jury testimony into evidence because the defendant threatened 
the witness). See also, John R. Kroger, "The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.u. L. 
REV. 835, 846 (1996) (describing the effect of the waiver of the right of 
confrontation);" See Simon & Shuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime 
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (noting that "no man shall 'take advantage 
of his own wrong'''); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 838 n.6 
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing the "standing maxim that no man shall be allowed to 
make any advantage of his own wrong"). See United States v. White, 116 F. 3d 903, 
912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (agreeing with a majority of the courts that misconduct 
resulting in the loss of confrontation rights necessarily causes the forfeiture of the 
hearsay exception.)). 
76 United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (1 st Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
murder of a witness results in the simultaneous waiver of confrontation rights and a 
hearsay objection) (See Tales From The Crypt, 31 ST. MARY'S L. J. 99, n. 130: 
"[O]nce the waiver occurs through defendant misconduct, the need for the evidence 
grows."). Although the courts refer to this concept as waiver, it is more accurately 
described as forfeiture. Because the cases uniformly refer to this concept as waiver, 
however, this article will do the same; United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441,442 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that the defendant waived all hearsay objections by procuring the 
witness's absence); See also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 
1979). 
77 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). 
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declarant as a witness. This recognizes 
the need for a prophylactic rule to deal 
with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes 
at the heart of the system of justice 
itself'. . . . The wrongdoing need not 
consist of a criminal act. The rule 
applies to all parties, including the 
government. It applies to actions taken 
after the event to prevent a witness from 
testifying,78 
Although only added to Rule 804 as its own "stand-alone" 
exception in 1997, Rule 804(b)(6) previously had been widely 
recognized by many courts of appeals as a hearsay exception under 
the residual hearsay rule, then codified as Rule 804(b)(S),79 The origin 
of the Rule can be traced to a 1982 decision from the Second Circuit.80 
In United States v. Mastrangelo, the defendant was charged with 
various drug offenses, though only one eyewitness could tie him to 
the drug conspiracy. The Government had undercover wiretap 
evidence of the defendant threatening the witness and warning him 
not to testify against him at the grand jury. During trial, the witness 
was murdered on the way to the courthouse to testify. The trial 
judge, Chief Judge Jack Weinstein, declared a mistrial and denied the 
defendant's motion to preclude his re-prosecution based on the 
double jeopardy clause.8! In denying the motion, Chief Judge 
Weinstein expressed his belief that a preponderance of the evidence 
showed the defendant was either directly involved or indirectly 
acquiesced to the murder of the eyewitness. 
At the second trial, presided over by a different district judge, 
the Government moved to admit the grand jury testimony of the 
murdered eyewitness against the defendant under the residual 
78 Commentary to the 1997 changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Internal 
citations omitted). 
79 The 1997 changes to the Rules of Evidence deleted separate but identical "residual 
hearsay" exceptions in Rule 803 and 804 and codified them as a new Rule, Rule 807, 
the text of which was the same as the previous exceptions. Commentary to the 1997 
changes to the Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 708, 709 (1997). 
80 United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982). 
81 Id. at 272. 
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hearsay rule, then codified as Rule 804(b )(5). The defendant objected 
on the basis of the hearsay rule and the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause. The trial judge overruled both objections, 
finding particularized indicia of trustworthiness sufficient to admit 
the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b )(5). The defendant was 
convicted and appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the 
case for an additional evidentiary hearing to determine the 
involvement, if any, of the defendant in the murder of the eyewitness. 
In doing so, however, the court clearly agreed with the district court 
that an issue was raised regarding whether the defendant waived his 
Sixth Amendment rights and hearsay objection by directly causing or 
acquiescing to the witness's murder. It stated: 
If [the defendant] was involved in [the 
witness's] death, his involvement 
waived his confrontation clause 
objections to the admission of [the 
witness's] testimony. Because a waiver, 
if factually supported, will allow us to 
avoid resolution of the difficult legal 
and constitutional issues arising under 
the confrontation clause and Rule 
804(b )(5), we remand the case to the 
District Court for an evidentiary hearing 
on the question of [the defendant's] 
involvement in the murder of [the 
witness] .82 
As authority for its holding that a defendant may waive his or 
her Confrontation Clause rights by misconduct, the second circuit 
cited a series of Supreme Court decisions, as well as a host of circuit 
court cases standing for the principle that in either criminal or civil 
cases, lithe law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own 
wrong."83 The court summed up this point as follows: 
82Id. 
83 Id.at 272-73 (See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452-53; and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 
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Thus, if a witness' silence is procured by 
the defendant himself, whether by 
chicanery, by threats, or by actual 
violence or murder, the defendant 
cannot then assert his confrontation 
clause rights in order to prevent prior 
grand jury testimony of that witness 
from being admitted against him. Any 
other result would mock the very 
system of justice the confrontation 
clause was designed to protect. 84 
In addition, the court set forth the procedural requirements 
needed to establish the foundation to support a finding of waiver by 
wrongdoing. First, an evidentiary hearing is needed in the absence of 
the jury to determine the involvement of the party against whom the 
statement will be offered in procuring the unavailability of the 
declarant. Because the purpose of this hearing is to enable the trial 
court to determine, as a preliminary matter, whether a waiver by 
wrongdoing has occurred, the hearing is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 
l04(a).85 Further, the court held that the party seeking to introduce 
the statement of the unavailable declarant bears the burden of proof 
to establish the waiver.86 The court noted, however, that there was a 
split in authority as to the burden of proof that must be shown to 
establish the waiver - preponderance of the evidence (the standard 
typically applying to Fed. R. Evid. l04(a) preliminary determinations), 
or clear and convincing evidence.87 The court ultimately concluded: 
(1878)). 
[w]e see no reason to impose upon the 
government more than the usual burden 
84 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73. 
85 !d. at 273 (See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), which requires the Court to make 
preliminary determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence, the qualifications 
of witnesses, and the existence of privileges. In doing so, it need not strictly adhere 
to the rules of evidence, except for privilege. See also Rule 1101 (d)( 1)). 
86 Mastrangelo, 693 F.3d at 273. 
871d. at 274. 
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of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence where waiver by misconduct is 
concerned. Such a claim of waiver is not 
one which is either unusually subject to 
deception or disfavored by the law. To 
the contrary, such misconduct is 
invariably accompanied by tangible 
evidence such as the disappearance of 
the defendant, disruption in the 
courtroom or the murder of a key 
witness, and there is hardly any reason 
to apply a burden of proof which might 
encourage behavior which strikes at the 
heart of the system of justice itself.88 
The second circuit did caution, however, that despite its 
preliminary finding that the proper standard of proof was 
preponderance of the evidence, it was prudent for the district court, 
on remand, to make its fact-findings under the clear and convincing 
standard as well. The court further announced its intention to retain 
jurisdiction to address the issue again if raised in a subsequent 
appeal.89 As will be seen, the issue of what standard of proof governs 
preliminary hearings to determine whether to apply the waiver by 
wrongdoing doctrine continued to be a subject of disagreement 
among the federal courts for many years thereafter. 
The cases following Mastrangelo acknowledge its importance 
in shaping the doctrine of forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights 
and hearsay objections by wrongdoing. In understanding this 
doctrine, it is important to recognize the narrow foundation on which 
it rests. It was not adopted following a comprehensive examination 
of the substantive issues associated with either the Confrontation 
Clause or the hearsay rule;90 rather, it rests on a single concept - one 
whose wrongdoing directly or indirectly procures the unavailability 
of the declarant whose statement is offered at trial, by his own 
misconduct, waives the right to object. 
88Id. 
89 Jd. 
90Id. at 272. 
28 
It is, therefore, an 
unapologetic rule of necessity recognizing that any other outcome 
produces a result that is repugnant to a society that values the rule of 
law. 
The waiver doctrine on which Mastrangelo was premised has 
long been accepted in both the United States and Great Britain, which 
was the "immediate source" of our own Confrontation Clause 
protections.91 
Reynolds v. United States92 was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court recognized that Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause rights could be waived by a party's own misconduct. It 
continues to have vitality today, as it was cited with approval by the 
majority opinion in Crawford.93 Reynolds was charged with bigamy 
and prosecuted in the territorial courts of the Utah Territory. Prior to 
trial, the Government attempted to serve a subpoena on his second 
wife, but Reynolds and his first wife prevented the marshal from 
serving the subpoena by falsely representing that the second wife was 
not present. At trial, the Court allowed the prosecution to offer the 
testimony of the second wife against Reynolds in a prior bigamy 
charge, over Reynolds's objection.94 Reynolds was convicted, and 
subsequently appealed on a number of grounds, including an alleged 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, analyzing the Confrontation 
Clause issue as follows: 
The Constitution gives the accused the 
right to a trial at which he should be 
confronted with the witnesses against 
him; but if a witness is absent by his 
own wrongful procurement, he cannot 
complain if competent evidence is 
admitted to supply the place of that 
which he has kept away. The 
Constitution does not guarantee an 
accused person against the legitimate 
91 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359. 
92 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
93 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. 
94 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 149. 
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consequences of his own wrongful acts. 
It grants him the privilege of being 
confronted with the witnesses against 
him, but if he voluntarily keeps the 
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his 
privilege. If, therefore, when absent by 
his procurement, their evidence is 
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no 
condition to assert that his constitutional 
rights have been violated.95 
As authority for this ruling, the Court cited a series of cases 
from Great Britain, most notably Lord Morley's Case,96 in which the 
House of Lords discussed the forfeiture of confrontation rights by 
misconduct of a defendant, stating: 
[I]n case oath should be made that any 
witness, who has been examined by the 
coroner and was then absent, was 
detained by the means or procurement 
of the prisoner, and the opinion of the 
judges asked whether such examination 
might be read, we should answer, that if 
their lordships were satisfied by the 
evidence they had heard that the 
witness was detained by means or 
procurement of the prisoner, then the 
examination [by the coroner] might be 
read; but whether he was detained by 
means or procurement of the prisoner 
was matter of fact, of which we were not 
the judges, but their lordships.97 
The Reynolds Court noted that the ruling in Lord Morley's Case 
was "recognized as the law in England" following that decision, 
95 Jd. at 158. 
96 Lord Morley's Case, 6 State Trials, 770 (1666). 
97 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (quoting Lord Morley's Case). 
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citing a series of English precedents that followed the rule in Lord 
Morley's Case.98 The Supreme Court also explained the policy 
underlying the rule of forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights by 
misconduct as follows: 
The Rule has its foundation in the 
maxim that no one shall be permitted to 
take advantage of his own wrong; and 
consequently, if there has not been, in 
legal contemplation, a wrong 
committed, the way has not been 
opened for the introduction of the 
testimony [of the unavailable witness]. 
We are content with this long-
established usage, which, so far as we 
have been able to discover, has rarely 
been departed from. It is the outgrowth 
of a maxim based on the principles of 
common honesty, and, if properly 
administered, can harm no one.99 
Finally, the Court noted that the determination of whether a 
party committed misconduct that would waive confrontation rights 
was for the trial court to decide as a preliminary matter. tOO In Diaz v. 
United States,tOt the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Reynolds, stating, 
I/[t]he view that this right [of confrontation of witnesses in a criminal 
trial] may be waived also was recognized by this court in Reynolds v. 
United States . . . where testimony given on a first trial was held 
admissible on a second, even against a timely objection, because the 
witness was absent by the wrongful act of the accused."t02 The Court 
reiterated this position in Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,t03 
98 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (citing Lord Morley's Case) (citing Harrison's Case, 12 
Id. 851; Regina v. Scaife, 17 Ad. & El. N.S. 242; Drayton v. Wells, I Nott & M. 
(S.C.) 409; and Williams v. State o/Georgia, 19 Ga. 403). 
99 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159. 
100 Id. 
101 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 
102 Id. at 452 (Internal citations omitted). 
103 291 U.S. 97,106 (1934). 
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by stating I/[n]o doubt [a constitutional privilege] ... may be lost by 
consent or at times even by misconduct,"l04 and most recently in 
Crawford itself, where the Court stated, importantly: 
The Roberts test105 allows a jury to hear 
evidence, untested by the adversary 
process, based on a mere judicial 
determination of reliability. It thus 
replaces the constitutionally prescribed 
method of assessing reliability with a 
wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is 
very different from exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause that make no 
claim to be a surrogate means of 
assessing reliability. For example, the 
rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which 
we accept) extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds; 
it does not purport to be an alternative 
means of determining reliability.l06 
Thus, the key to understanding the constitutionality of Rule 
804(b)(6), as measured by the Confrontation Clause, is to recognize 
that it is predicated not on the assumption that the out-of-court 
statement of the unavailable declarant is admissible because there is 
some underlying indicia of reliability (such as with the other hearsay 
exceptions in Rules 803, 804, and 807, which excuse the need to 
produce the declarant for in-court testimony, cross examination, and 
to be confronted by the defendant), but instead on the equitable 
principle of forfeiture, or, less accurately, waiver. This outcome is 
viewed as necessary upon a finding that the unavailable witness's 
absence was caused by wrongful conduct initiated by, or acquiesced 
in, by a party, and done with the intent to render the witness 
unavailable. Thus, confrontation rights are not lost absent a showing 
of wrongful conduct by the defendant intended to induce a declarant 
104 Id. (citing Diaz v.United States). 
105 The Roberts test was overruled in Crawford. 
106 Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. 
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not to testify, which in fact produces that result. If properly 
established, it is difficult to summon much sympathy for the 
defendant who complains that introduction of the prior statement of 
the unavailable witness is unfair and violative of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Every federal circuit court of appeal, and a number of state 
courts, has found that, under these circumstances, forfeiture of Sixth 
Amendment rights is appropriate. The constitutionality of the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing has been accepted by every 
federal circuit court of appeal that has considered it, without 
exception, as reflected in the following table: 
First Circuit 
United States v. Houlihan, 
92 F. 3d 1271, 1279 
(1st Cir. 1996). 
Second Circuit 
United States v. Aguiar, 
975 F.2d 45,47 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
"Though the Confrontation Clause is 
a cornerstone of our adversary system 
of justice, it is not an absolute . . . 
[m]oreover, a defendant may waive 
his right to confrontation by knowing 
and intentional relinquishment . . . 
[w]hile a waiver of right to confront 
witnesses typically is express, the law 
is settled that a defendant also may 
waive it through his intentional 
misconduct . . .. By the same token, 
courts will not suffer a party to profit 
by his own wrongdoing. Thus, a 
defendant who wrongfully procures a 
witness's absence for the purpose of 
denying the government that 
witness's testimony waives his right 
under the Confrontation Clause to 
object to the admission of the absent 
witness's hearsay statements." 
(Internal citations omitted). 
"A defendant who procures a 
witness's absence waives the right of 
confrontation for all purposes with 
regard to that witness, not just to the 
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Fourth Circuit 
United States v. Johnson, 
219 F.3d 349, 355 
(4th Cir. 2000). 
Fifth Circuit 
United States v. Thevis, 
665 F.2d 616, 630 
(5th Cir. 1982). 
admission of sworn hearsay 
statements. We may assume that the 
admission of facially unreliable 
hearsay would raise a due process 
issue, although it is hard to imagine 
circumstances in which such evidence 
would survive Fed. R. Evid. 403' s test 
of weighing probative value against 
prejudicial effect, an objection that is 
not waived by procuring a witness's 
absence." 
"The district court appears to have 
admitted Thomas' hearsay because, 
inter alia, Raheem forfeited his hearsay 
objections, under Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6), by having caused the 
unavailability of Thomas as a witness 
. . . . The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in so holding." 
"We conclude that a defendant who 
causes a witness to be unavailable for 
trial for the purpose of preventing 
that witness from testifying also 
waives his right to confrontation .... 
A defendant who undertakes this 
conduct realizes that the witness is no 
longer available and cannot be cross-
examined. Hence in such a situation 
the defendant has intelligently and 
knowingly waived his confrontation 
rights. The policy interests 
underlying the confrontation clause, 
moreover, mandate this result. We 
recognize that the right of 
confrontation is so fundamental to 
our concept of a fair trial that it is a 
34 
Sixth Circuit 
Steele v. Taylor, 
684 F.2d 1193, 1201-03 
(6th Cir. 1982). 
privilege specifically guaranteed by 
the Constitution. Nevertheless ... the 
right is not absolute, and must give 
way at times to stronger state 
interests. Similarly, when 
confrontation becomes impossible 
due to the actions of the very person 
who would assert the right, logic 
dictates that the right has been 
waived. The law simply cannot 
countenance a defendant deriving 
benefits from murdering the chief 
witness against him. To permit such 
subversion of a criminal prosecution 
'would be contrary to public policy, 
common sense, and the underlying 
purpose of the confrontation clause' .. 
. and make a mockery of the system of 
justice that the right was designed to 
protect." (Internal citations omitted). 
"From these cases we derive 
essentially the same rule as the one 
stated by the state trial judge. A prior 
statement given by a witness made 
unavailable by the wrongful conduct 
of a party is admissible against the 
party if the statement would have 
been admissible had the witness 
testified. The rule ... is based on a 
public policy protecting the integrity 
of the adversary process by deterring 
litigants from acting on strong 
incentives to prevent the testimony of 
an adverse witness. The rule is also 
based on a principle of reciprocity 
similar to the equitable doctrine of 
, clean hands.' The law prefers live 
35 
Seventh Circuit 
United States v. Scott, 
284 F.3d 758, 762 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
Eighth Circuit 
United States v. Carlson, 
547 F.2d 1346, 1359 
(8th Cir. 1977). 
Tenth Circuit 
United States v. Balano, 
618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th 
Cir.1979)(rev'd 
on other grounds). 
testimony over hearsay, a preference 
designed to protect everyone, 
particularly the defendant. A 
defendant cannot prefer the law's 
preference and profit from it ... while 
repudiating that preference by 
creating the condition that prevents 
it." 
"It is, of course, well-established that 
a defendant forfeits his Confrontation 
Clause rights by wrongfully 
procuring the unavailability of a 
witness." 
liThe law will not place its imprimatur 
on the practice of threatening 
Government witnesses into not 
testifying at trial and courts should 
not permit the accused to derive any 
direct or tangential benefit from such 
conduct ... [n]or should the law 
permit an accused to subvert a 
criminal prosecution by causing 
witnesses not to testify at trial who 
have, at the pretrial stage, disclosed 
information which is inculpatory as to 
the accused. To permit the defendant 
to profit from such conduct would be 
contrary to public policy, common 
sense and the underlying purpose of 
the confrontation clause." 
"We agree that, under the common 
law principle that one should not 
profit by his own wrong, coercion can 
constitute voluntary waiver of the 
right of confrontation." 
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District of Columbia Circuit 
United States v. White, 
116 F.3d 903, 911 
(D.D.C. 1997). 
"Even though the right of 
confrontation is both constitutional 
and critical to the integrity of the fact-
finding process ... the defendant may 
lose it through misconduct .... It is 
hard to imagine a form of misconduct 
more extreme than the murder of a 
potential witness. Simple equity 
supports a forfeiture principle, as 
does a common sense attention to the 
need for fit incentives. The defendant 
who has removed an adverse witness 
is in a weak position to complain 
about losing the chance to cross-
examine him. And where a defendant 
has silenced a witness through the use 
of threats, violence or murder, 
admission of the victim's prior 
statements at least partially offsets the 
perpetrator's rewards for his 
misconduct. We have no hesitation in 
finding, in league with all circuits to 
have considered the matter, that a 
defendant who wrongfully procures 
the absence of a witness or potential 
witness may not assert confrontation 
rights as to that witness." (Internal 
citations omitted). 
Although the circuit courts have not always agreed entirely on 
how the Rule should be administered,107 not one has expressed any 
107 For example, most of the circuit courts, and the drafters of Rule 804(b)(6), 
conclude that because the determination whether the defendant actively, or 
indirectly, procured by wrongdoing the absence of the witness whose prior statement 
is offered under the Rule is a preliminary determination under FED. R. EVID. 
104(a), the foundational facts need only be shown by a preponderance of evidence. 
See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653-54 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 
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serious reservations about the need for the Rule. What was absent 
prior to Crawford was any direct comment from the United States 
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Rule 804(b)(6) following its 
codification as a separate hearsay exception in 1997. Crawford 
supplied this missing link: "For example, the rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on 
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative 
means of determining reliability."108 
Critics of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule certainly can 
argue that Crawford principally addresses a different rule (i.e. 
statements of an unavailable declarant against a penal, proprietary, or 
pecuniary interest),t09 and therefore, the comments of the majority 
constitute mere dicta. This view, however, offers scant support for a 
conclusion that there is any serious constitutional infirmity in Rule 
804(b)(6), given the breadth of Crawford's examination of the hearsay 
rule and Confrontation Clause, as well as its discussion of many 
hearsay exceptions other than Rule 804(b)(3). 
In addition to the federal courts, at least ten state courts have 
adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule: 
Arizona 
State v. Valencia, 
924 P.2d 497,502 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
"If a defendant silences a witness by 
violence or murder, the defendant cannot 
then assert his Confrontation Clause 
rights in order to prevent the admission 
762 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921,926-27 (8th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); Commentary to the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 171 F.R.D. 719 ("The usual Rule 104(a) 
preponderance of the evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the 
new Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to discourage"). One circuit court, however, has ruled that 
the foundational facts must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. United 
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,631 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, some circuit courts 
have required that the court hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to hear 
the evidence supporting the introduction of a statement under Rule 804(b)(6). 
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he district court must 
hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury in which the government 
has the burden of proving [the foundational facts] by a preponderance of the 
evidence"). Other courts have not required a separate evidentiary hearing. United 
States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926; United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914-15 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
108 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (Emphasis added). 
109 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). 
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District of Columbia 
Devonshire v. United 
States, 
691 A.2d 165, 168 
(D.C. 1997). 
of prior testimony from that witness . . . . 
In such circumstances, a defendant is 
deemed to have waived both his 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay 
objections to the admission of the 
witness's statements. . . . Prior to 
admitting testimony pursuant to this 
principle, the trial court must hold a 
hearing at which the government has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant was 
responsible for the witness' absence." 
(Internal citations omitted). 
"We agree with the overwhelming weight 
of authority that appellant's 
Confrontation Clause rights must fall in 
these circumstances. As the trial judge 
correctly observed, a defendant's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause are not 
absolute. A defendant may waive his 
right to confrontation by express waiver. 
. . or through his own intentional 
misconduct .... Nor is a defendant 
protected when he I does away with 
witnesses against him.' All federal and 
state courts that have addressed this 
issue, that we could find, have concluded 
that when a defendant procures a 
witness's unavailability for trial with the 
purpose of preventing the witness from 
testifying, the defendant waives his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause to object 
to the admission of the absent witness' 
hearsay statements." (Internal citations 
omitted). 
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Iowa 
State v. Hallum, 
606 N.W.2d 351,354-56 
(Iowa 2000). 
Kansas 
State v. Gettings, 
769 P.2d 25, 28 
(Kan. 1989). 
Louisiana 
State v. Magouirk, 
539 So. 2d 50, 64-65 
(La. Ct. App. 1988). 
" A waiver is an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right . . . . A 
forfeiture, on the other hand, is the loss of 
a right as a result of misconduct .... As a 
review of the case law shows, the focus of 
the courts holding that a defendant has 
lost his right to object to the admission of 
an out-of-court statement falls more 
clearly within the common definition of a 
forfeiture .... When a court finds that a 
defendant has procured a witness's 
unavailability, the defendant is precluded 
from asserting his constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against him as a 
basis to prevent the admission of prior 
statements given by the witness . . . . 
Hearsay objections are also forfeited." 
(Internal citations omitted). 
"The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and § 10 of the Bill of 
Rights of the Kansas Constitution provide 
criminal defendants with the right to 
confront witnesses against them . . . . A 
defendant, however, can waive the right 
to confrontation. '[W]hen confrontation 
becomes impossible due to the actions of 
the very person who would assert the 
right, logic dictates that the right has been 
waived. The law simply cannot 
countenance a defendant deriving 
benefits from murdering the chief witness 
against him.'" (Internal citations omitted). 
Adopting as the Law of Louisiana the 
rulings in the federal cases, including 
Mastrangelo, Thevis and Balano, supra. 
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Minnesota 
State v. Black, 
291 N.W.2d 208,214 
(Minn. 1980). 
New Jersey 
State v. Sheppard, 
484 A.2d 1330, 1341-43 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div.1984). 
New York 
Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 
460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595-98 
(App. N.Y. Div. 1983). 
Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee 
Penn. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) 
and Tenn. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6). 
liThe law is clear that if a witness is 
unavailable because of the wrongdoing of 
the defendant, the defendant cannot 
complain if other competent evidence is 
introduced to take the place of the 
witness' testimony." (Internal citations 
omitted). 
Adopting the position taken by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds, and the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing rule articulated 
in other federal cases. 
Adopting the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
rule articulated in Mastrangelo, Balano, 
Thevis, and other federal cases. 
Adopting the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
rule articulated by Reynolds, Snyder, Diaz 
and Mastrangelo. 
The Maryland Rules do not contain an equivalent to Rule 
804(b)(6). During the 2004 legislative session, however, the Office of 
the Governor introduced bills in the House of Delegates and the 
Senate to add such a rule. Senate Bill 185 and House Bill 296 
proposed to add to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, section 
10-901, the following: 
(A) A statement is not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the statement is offered 
against a party that has engaged or 
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was 
intended to and did procure the 
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unavailability of the Witness as defined 
in Maryland Rule 5-804 who was the 
declarant of the statement. 
(B) The court shall determine the 
admissibility of a statement under this 
section in the manner provided in the 
Maryland Rules. 
Proposed section 1O-901(a) is substantially identical to Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(b)(6). The provision in 10-901(b) of the proposed Rule 
directs that, in determining whether to admit statements under the 
Rule, the trial court is governed by the Maryland Rules. The effect of 
this provision would be to incorporate by reference Rule 5-104(a) of 
the Maryland Rules, which governs preliminary evidentiary 
determinations and applies a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.I1o Neither bill passed, and the effort to adopt the Rule 
failed. 
Given the likelihood that the Rule again will be proposed in 
future legislative sessions, or, alternatively, that it will be proposed 
for consideration to the Rules Committee of the Maryland Courts for 
incorporation into the Maryland Rules, it is appropriate to consider 
whether Maryland should have the Rule. With respect to the 
constitutionality of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule, the case law 
discussed above, particularly the Supreme Court's decision in 
Crawford, disposes of any credible Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause argument against the Rule. It cannot be argued seriously that 
there is any independent basis for opposing the Rule under the 
Confrontation Clause provisions of Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, given that the origin of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing rule comes from the English Common law, and the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pari materia with the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause.111 
If it is accepted that there is no viable Confrontation Clause 
challenge to adopting a forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
110 L. McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE (1994), § 2.104.4, at p. 69. 
III See, e.g. Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547,636 A. 2d 463 (1994); Craig v. State, 
322 Md. 418,588 A. 2d 328 (1991); and Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 660 A. 2d 
986 (1995). 
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hearsay rule, the only remaining question to address is whether there 
is a need for it. While there is no useful empirical evidence to answer 
this question, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence 
demonstrating a compelling need for adopting the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing rule in Maryland.l12 
112 See, e.g. Protecting Witnesses, Editorial, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 14, 2004, 
2004 WL 84123923 (Discussing witness intimidation in Baltimore City and Prince 
George's County. Reporting that in May, 2004 Baltimore City prosecutors dropped 
13 of 52 shooting cases because of witness problems); Gail Gibson, Drug Trial 
Witness Helps Efforts to Convict Ex-Friends: u.s. Prosecutors Say Men Were 
Members of Gang, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 6, 2004 at Local IB (Recounting 
evidence of witness intimidation in drug prosecution in federal court in Baltimore 
City); Conspiracy of Silence, Editorial, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 16,2004 at 18A 
(Stating that in the past year Baltimore City prosecutors relocated 95 witnesses for 
their protection, dismissed 90 non-fatal shootings because of witness problems, 
primarily witness intimidation); Gail Gibson, Survivor Tells Jury of Attack that Left 
Two Friends Dead, Federal Death-Penalty Trial Focuses on Drug Activity, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 12, 2004 at Local 2B (Describing killing of key witness in 
federal drug prosecution in Baltimore City); Allison Klein, Ehrlich Targets Witness 
Threats Under Bill, Intimidation or Harm Would Carry Increased Penalties: 
Measure Could Allow Hearsay Opponents Include Defense Attorneys, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 9, 2004 at Local IB (Reporting comments of a Baltimore 
City homicide prosecutor that in 90 percent of his cases, witnesses are afraid to 
testify; commenting on 2002 arson death of Baltimore family as act of retaliation; 
and describing other cases where witness intimidation hampered or prevented 
prosecution of criminal cases); Neely Tucker, Girl's Slaying Opens Window on 
Intimidation, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2004 at AOl (Reporting efforts to 
address witness intimidation in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia; 
reporting opinions of District of Columbia Superior Court judge and Prince George's 
County Circuit Court judge that witness intimidation is a frequent event; reporting 
estimate of the U.S. Attorney that in last decade, drug gangs have killed more than 
two dozen informants or witnesses in the District of Columbia); Robert Redding, Jr., 
Annapolis Mayor Wants Assembly to Protect Witnesses, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 
Dec. l, 2003 (Reporting efforts of Annapolis mayor to introduce legislation before 
the Maryland General Assembly to offer protections against witness intimidation; 
reporting that witness problems in Baltimore City prevented 60 percent of city's 
criminal cases); Allison Klein, Spain Gets 25 Years in Shooting: W. Baltimore Boy, 
10, Hit with Stray Bullet on Stoop in July 2002; Judge Calls Crime 'Vicious '; Case 
Heard in Two Trials; Key Witness Also Killed, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 24, 2003 
at Local lB (Reporting "catastrophic loss" to prosecution case caused by killing of 
key witness); Kimberly A.C. Wilson, Suspect in Shooting is Killed Days After 
Charge Is Dropped, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 26, 2003 at Local 8B (Reporting 
comments of representative of city prosecutor's office regarding killing of 
prosecution witness, describing an "escalating pattern"); Caitlin Francke, Changing 
Stories Tangle City Courts: Recanting Witnesses Frequently Switch Statements 
When They Get on the Stand, Frustrating Judges and Prosecutors, THE BALTIMORE 
SUN, Nov. 20, 2000 at Telegraph lA (Reporting that prosecutor's and judges in 
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The problem does not seem to be restricted to Maryland and 
Washington D.C. Commentators have noted the increasing problem 
of witness intimidation throughout the country: 
[A] Department of Justice Study found 
evidence that there had indeed been an 
increase in witness intimidation in the 
late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s. 
A number of prosecutors linked this 
increase in violent victim and witness 
intimidation to the advent of gang-
controlled crack sales in the mid to late 
1980s. Several prosecutors estimated 
that victim and witness intimidation is 
suspected in up to 75-100 percent of the 
violent crimes committed in some gang-
dominated neighborhoods. A National 
Institute of Justice assessment found 
that "51 percent of prosecutors in large 
jurisdictions and 43 percent in small 
jurisdictions said that intimidation of 
victim and witnesses was a major 
problem" .... An additional 30 percent 
of prosecutors in large jurisdictions and 
"25 percent in small jurisdictions labeled 
intimidation a moderate problem."ll3 
Those who oppose the adoption of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule often raise objections other 
than constitutional challenges. They talk about the danger of criminal 
convictions based upon false testimony of witnesses who make 
incriminating pretrial statements to police, or in grand jury testimony, 
Baltimore City say that witness recantations seriously hamper criminal prosecution, 
estimating that witnesses change stories in approximately 50 percent of cases). 
113 Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing-Old Wine in a New Bottle-Solving the Mystery of the Codification of 
the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b06), 80 NEB. L. REv. 891,904-05. 
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but who do not testify at trial where they may be cross-examined and 
must confront the defendant against whom they testify.114 Candor 
requires an acknowledgment that adoption of a forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule does pose some risk of 
admitting unreliable testimony. The existing rules of evidence, 
however, offer abundant safeguards to address this risk. Proper 
administration of the Rule by trial judges, with overSight by the 
appellate courts, would reduce any realistic degree of risk such that, 
when compared to the societal harm posed by not having the Rule, 
the risk is substantially outweighed. 
First, if the Rule proposed by the Governor, which is in 
substance Fed. R. Evid. B04(b)(6), is adopted, it would require 
prosecutors to lay a proper foundation before the statement of the 
unavailable witness may be admitted. The State would be required to 
show: (1) that the witness was unavailable to testify because of any of 
the reasons stated in Md. Rule 5-B04(a);115 (2) that the party against 
whom the statement would be offered at trial (typically the criminal 
defendant) either personally acted, or acquiesced in, the action of 
others; (3) that the action was wrongful; (4) that the action was 
intended to procure the unavailability of the witness; and (5) that the 
action actually did procure the unavailability of the witness. 
The trial court has discretion, under Md. Rule 5-104(a), not to 
relax application of the rules of evidence and to require the prosecutor 
114 Allison Klein, Ehrlich Targets Witness Threats Under Bill: Intimidation or Harm 
Would Carry Increased Penalties; Measure Could Allow Hearsay Opponents 
Include Defense Attorneys, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 9, 2004 at Local 1B 
(Reporting the opposition to the legislation proposed to adopt the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay clause of Baltimore criminal defense attorney). 
liS Rule 5-804(a) identifies five circumstances in which a witness is deemed 
unavailable: if exempted from testifying by asserting a privilege; by refusing to 
testify despite a court order to do so; if the witness testifies to a lack of memory 
about the subject of the testimony; if the witness may not testify because of death, 
infirmity or physical or mental illness; and if the witness is beyond the power of the 
court to compel his or her presence at trial. Importantly, the rule also states "[a] 
statement will not qualify under section (b) of this Rule if the unavailability is due to 
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying." Thus, if there is evidence that 
the prosecution or law enforcement authorities have engaged in any wrongdoing to 
induce the declarant to be unavailable, the absent witness's statement would not be 
admissible. 
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to make this showing through facts that are admissible under the 
rules of evidence. Furthermore, Md. Rule 5-104(c) permits the trial 
judge to require that the prosecutor lay the foundation for the 
statement out of the presence of the jury, so it cannot be prejudiced if 
the court rules that the statement is not admissible. Even after the 
prosecutor has made the preliminary showing required by the Rule, 
the trial judge may still examine the content of the statement to be 
offered and exclude it if it otherwise would be inadmissible, even if 
the witness was present to testify. Thus, if the absent witness's 
statement contains inadmissible speculation or opinion, it may be 
excluded under Md. Rules 5-701 or 5-702. If it appears that the 
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts contained in the 
statement, it may be excluded under Md. Rule 5-602. The credibility 
of the witness could be attacked if (1) he had a qualifying prior 
criminal conviction affecting his truthfulness; (2) he is biased against 
the defendant; (3) he has a poor reputation for truthfulness; (4) there 
is some defect in the ability of the witness to perceive, remember and 
relate facts; or (5) the witness has given an inconsistent version of the 
facts, all of which are impeaching facts that may be brought out by the 
defendant under Md. Rule 5-806. Additionally, if the trial court 
determines that the probative value of the witness's statement is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, the statement may be excluded under Md. Rule 5-403. 
Finally, if the trial judge admits the statement over the defendant's 
objection and the defendant is convicted and appeals, the appellate 
courts can review the trial judge's ruling for error. 
These procedural protections, combined with the preliminary 
foundation that must be shown by the prosecutor, provide powerful 
protections against convictions based on unreliable evidence. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that, in the federal system, the rule 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing has been in widespread use for more 
than twenty years. There has been no credible showing that its use 
has resulted in unfair convictions. 
In the end, the question of whether to adopt the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule requires the making of a 
choic~ between possible harmful outcomes. On one hand, there is 
overwhelming anecdotal evidence that witness intimidation is 
widespread in Maryland, and that this problem is imposing a serious 
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burden on prosecutors in obtaining convictions in very serious cases. 
Defendants have literally been able to get away with murder by 
killing or intimidating the witnesses who could prove their guilt. On 
the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility that, 
notwithstanding the procedural and substantive safeguards built into 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule and the rules of evidence in 
general, there may be instances of convictions based, in part, on 
unreliable witness statements. The evidence of the harm done by not 
having the Rule is voluminous and immediate. The evidence of harm 
in adopting the Rule is conjectural and unsupported by more than 
twenty years of experience in the federal system. On balance, the 
time is long overdue to adopt this Rule. 
47 
